Chambers of Ishaan Garg
Ch. No. 217, Western Wing, District & Sessions Court, Tis Hazari, New Delhi, Delhi 110054
+91 8851742417, +91 8800386163
This aspect has also come up for judicial consideration before this Court in Pramod Mahto and Others vs. State of Bihar, (1989) Supp (2) SCC 672 wherein this Court held that the Explanation has been introduced with a view to effectively dealt with the growing menace of gang rape and in such circumstances, it was not necessary that the prosecution should adduce clinching proof of complete act of rape by each one of the accused on the victim or on each one of the victims where there are more than one. {Para 21}
22. Further, in Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 2 SCC 143, it was held as under:-
“8. Charge against the appellant is under Section 376(2)(g) IPC.
In order to establish an offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, read with Explanation I thereto, the prosecution must adduce evidence to indicate that more than one accused had acted in concert and in such an event, if rape had been committed by even one, all the accused will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been raped by one or more of them and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed act of rape by each one of the accused. In other words, this provision embodies a principle of joint liability and the essence of that liability is the existence of common intention; that common intention presupposes prior concert which may be determined from the conduct of offenders revealed during the course of action and it could arise and be formed suddenly, but,there must be meeting of minds. It is not enough to have the same intention independently of each of the offenders. In such cases, there must be criminal sharing marking out a certain measure of jointness in the commission of offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. In view of this, it is very clear that in a case of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention. Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.
24. In this case, as is clear from the sequence of events, the abduction of the victim, her wrongful confinement, her testimony about being subjected to sexual assault clearly points to the fact that the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) are squarely attracted and the appellant herein along with Jalandhar Kol acted in concert and with a common intention to sexually assault the prosecutrix ‘R’.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 17398/2024)
RAJU @ UMAKANT Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J.
Citation: 2025 INSC 615.
Dated: 1 st May, 2025.
